Civil Rights - Under Section 1983 Prison Officials Are Not Liable to Prisoner for Injuries Inflicted as Result of Officials\u27 Negligence by Wright, Donna M.
Volume 30 Issue 3 Article 12 
1985 
Civil Rights - Under Section 1983 Prison Officials Are Not Liable to 
Prisoner for Injuries Inflicted as Result of Officials' Negligence 
Donna M. Wright 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donna M. Wright, Civil Rights - Under Section 1983 Prison Officials Are Not Liable to Prisoner for Injuries 
Inflicted as Result of Officials' Negligence, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 958 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/12 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1985]
CIVIL RIGHTS-UNDER SECTION 1983 PRISON OFFICIALS ARE NOT
LIABLE TO PRISONER FOR INJURIES INFLICTED AS RESULT OF
OFFICIALS' NEGLIGENCE
Davidson v. O'Lone (1984)
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code' protects an indi-
vidual from "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States by a person
acting under color of state law.2 As a result of its broad language, this
section has been frequently invoked in federal litigation over the past
two decades. 3 While section 1983 clearly reaches intentional depriva-
tions, 4 much confusion exists as to whether section 1983 reaches negli-
gent conduct.
5
The Third Circuit recently confronted this issue in Davidson v.
O'Lone,6 when an inmate brought a section 1983 action against state
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
2. Id.
3. See Note, Basis of Liability in a Section 1983 Suit. When is the State-of-Mind
Analysis Relevant?, 57 IND. L.J. 459, 459 (1982). Claims by prisoners constitute a
large percentage of § 1983 actions. See Aldisert,Judicial Expansion of Federaljuris-
diction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload,
1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557.
4. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) (absence of showing of
purposeful discrimination by defendants in depriving state assembly candidate
of nomination defeated § 1983 claim); Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Ful-
lerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 1080 (7th Cir. 1978) (§ 1983 suit against county and state
tax officials could be maintained where plaintiffs constitutional rights were in-
tentionally violated or recklessly disregarded), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1171 (1978);
Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State-of-Mind Re-
quirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 45 (1977). Professor Kirkpatrick notes that con-
stitutional violations committed under color of state law are distinct from state
common law tort violations. Id.
5. Many commentators have analyzed the controversy. See, e.g., McClellan
& Northcross, Remedies and Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 18 Duq. L.
REV. 409 (1980); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980); Note,
supra note 3; Note, Section 1983 Liability for Negligence, 58 NEB. L. REV. 271 (1978);
Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683 (1983).
6. 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon,
105 S. Ct. 2673 (1985).
(958)
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prison officials based on the officials' negligence. 7 Sitting en banc, the
Third Circuit rejected the prisoner's claim, holding that negligence was
not actionable under section 1983.8
The controversy arose when Robert Davidson, an inmate at New
Jersey's Leesburg State Prison, was threatened by another inmate,
McMillian, after the two left a disciplinary hearing on December 19,
1980. 9 Davidson described the threat in a note addressed to the hearing
officer, ArthurJones.t 0 BecauseJones was not part of the prison admin-
istration, he directed that the note be passed to appropriate prison au-
thorities. 1 ' The note was then delivered to Joseph Cannon, the assistant
superintendent of the prison. 12 Since Cannon did not consider the mat-
ter urgent, he instructed a guard to deliver the note to Corrections Ser-
geant Robert James.' 3 James received the note approximately two
hours later but left it on his desk without reading it while he attended to
his responsibilities in other parts of the prison. 14 James returned to his
office briefly that day, but by that time had forgotten about the note.
15
7. Id. at 819-20. The claimant alleged that because prison officials were
negligent in failing to respond to a threat against the claimant by another in-
mate, the claimant was seriously injured. Id. Consequently the claimant con-
tended that his interest in being free from bodily injury was violated. Id. at 820.
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of this claim, see infra notes 26-
55 and accompanying text.
8. 752 F.2d at 830-31.
9. Id. at 819. The disciplinary hearing concerned a December 17, 1980,
fight between McMillian and a third inmate, in which Davidson intervened. Id.
10. Id. The contents of Davidson's note were as follows:
When I went back to the unit after seeing you McMillian was on the
steps outside the unit. When I was going past him he told me "I'll f---
you up you old mother-f---ing fag." Go up to your cell. I be right
there.
I ignored this and went to another person's cell and thought about
it. Then I figured I should tell you so "if" anything develops you would
be aware.
I'm quite content to let this matter drop but evidently McMillian
isn't.
Thank you, R. Davidson
Id. Davidson testified that he wrote the note to exonerate himself in case McMil-
lian started a fight and that he also wanted McMillian to be reprimanded. Id.
11. Id. It is unclear from the record whether Jones actually read the note.
12. Id. Cannon received the note at 11:40 a.m. and read it at that time. Id.
13. Id. Cannon testified that Davidson's failure to contact him directly, as
Davidson had done in the past on various occasions, indicated to him that the
matter was not urgent. Id.
14. Id. However, when the note was delivered, shortly after 2:00 p.m., the
guard delivering the note informed James that the note reported a threat by
McMillian against Davidson. Id.
15. Id. Between the time he received the note and the time he came off
duty that night, James spent only about 10 minutes in his office. Id. James testi-
fied that if he had read the note, he would have interviewed the inmates involved
and posted the note to alert the officers coming on duty. Id. Neither Cannon
nor James worked the next two days. Id.
2
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No preventive measures were taken by prison personnel in response to
McMillian's threat. 16 On December 21, 1980, McMillian attacked David-
son with a fork, causing severe wounds.' 7
Precluded from recovering in state court under the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act,' 8 Davidson sued Jones, Cannon, James, and the prison su-
perintendent, Edward O'Lone, in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of O'Lone, but found that Cannon
and James negligently deprived Davidson of his constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in freedom from assault without due process of
law. 20 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court's
judgment as it applied to Cannon and James. 2 1
Judge Sloviter, writing for the majority, 22 began her analysis by ad-
dressing defendants' first assertion that the district court erred in find-
16. Id.
17. Id. Davidson suffered stab wounds to the face, neck, head, and body;
additionally, he sustained a broken nose which required surgery. Id.
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(4) (West 1982). The New Jersey Tort Claims
Act provides in pertinent part: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is
liable for: . . . b. any injury caused by: . . . (4) a prisoner to any other prisoner.
Id. § 59:5-2. The provision was enacted in response to a New Jersey Superior
Court case in which prison officials were held liable in negligence for the failure
to prevent one inmate's assault of another inmate when the officials had warning
of the assault. Id. § 59:5-2 comment (citing Harris v. State, 118 N.J. Super. 384,
297 A.2d 561 (App. Div. 1972)).
19. 752 F.2d at 819-20. For the text of § 1983, see supra note 1. For a
summary of Davidson's fourteenth amendment claim, see supra note 7. David-
son also contended that defendants' conduct violated the eighth amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 752 F.2d at 820.
20. 752 F.2d at 820. The Third Circuit succinctly described the district
court's reasoning as follows:
Cannon and Jones [sic] were negligent; as a result of that negligence,
Davidson was injured; freedom from bodily injury is a liberty interest
which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution;
New Jersey does not provide prisoners, such as Davidson, with a rem-
edy in state court because it immunizes its employees against claims for
injuries to a prisoner caused by another prisoner; ergo Davidson can
recover under § 1983.
Id. at 822. Compensatory damages of $2,000 were awarded under § 1983. Id. at
820.
The district court, however, found that Davidson did not establish an eighth
amendment violation because the defendants "did not act with deliberate or cal-
lous indifference" to his medical needs, and because "the incident complained
of was a single attack." Id.
21. Id. at 820, 831.
22. Id. at 818-31. Judge Sloviter was joined in her majority opinion by
Chief Judge Aldisert, and Judges Hunter and Becker. Judge Garth wrote a con-
curring opinion in which Judge Weis joined. See id. at 831 (Garth, J., concur-
ring). Judges Seitz and Gibbons dissented in separate opinions, and Judge
Higginbotham joined both of those dissents. See id. at 833 (Seitz, J., dissenting);
id. at 835 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); id. at 854 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
960
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ing that the defendants were negligent. 23 Judge Sloviter explained that
the "clearly erroneous" standard was the applicable standard for review-
ing the findings of a trial court sitting without a jury.24 Applying this
standard, the Third Circuit accepted the trial court's finding of negli-
gence on the part of prison employees.
2 5
Next, Judge Sloviter turned to defendants' second contention that
Davidson had no constitutionally protected liberty interest to be free
from physical attack by other prisoners. 26 The court noted that the
fourteenth amendment protects individuals from "unjustified intrusions
23. Id. at 820. The district court made the following conclusions with re-
spect to Cannon and James:
We find that these two defendants negligently failed to take reasonable
steps to protect plaintiff, and that he was injured as a result. Both of
these officials had the responsibility to care for plaintiffs safety, actual
notice of the threat by an inmate with a known history of violence, and
an opportunity to prevent harm to plaintiff.
Id. (citing Davidson v. O'Lone, No. 81-253, slip. op. at 18 (D.N.J. Dec. 15,
1982)).
The defendants alleged that the district court erred in finding: (1) that de-
fendants knew about McMillian's past; (2) that defendants failed to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect Davidson; and (3) that defendants' failure to follow
prison procedures proximately caused the injury. Id.
24. Id. (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (finding
that company did not intentionally discriminate was factual in nature, and as
such could only be rejected by appellate court if "clearly erroneous"); FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a) (findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous)).
The Davidson court further explained that the "[defendants] thus bear the
heavy burden of convincing us that the district court determination either 'is
completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of cred-
ibility,' or 'bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.' "
752 F.2d at 820 (quoting Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972)).
25. 752 F.2d at 820-21. The Third Circuit acknowledged that the fact-
finder could have concluded differently on the issue of negligence, but refused
to overturn the district court's finding, since the issue could not be decided as a
matter of law and since the Third Circuit was not "left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 821 (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
The Third Circuit explained that the proper standard of care owed by
prison custodians in New Jersey was articulated in Harris v. State. Id. (citing Har-
ris v. State, 61 N.J. 585, 297 A.2d 561 (1972)). In Hais, a prisoner returned to
his cell after a meal, and was stabbed by another prisoner who had been hiding
in the cell. 61 N.J. at 587, 297 A.2d at 562. The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that in such a situation prison officials were liable to the injured prisoner
only if they had warning of the attack. Id. at 590-93, 297 A.2d at 563-65. Apply-
ing the Harris standard, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court's find-
ing that the defendants had "actual notice of the threat by an inmate with a
known history of violence," satisfied the warning requirement. 752 F.2d at 820.
26. 752 F.2d at 821. The Third Circuit recognized that since § 1983 only
protects rights "secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States, Da-
vidson had to establish as a threshold matter that such a right was infringed in
order to assert a § 1983 claim. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01
(1976) (because plaintiff in defamation suit failed to show that any specific con-
stitutional guarantee had been violated, his § 1983 suit was dismissed); Smith v.
Spina, 477 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1973) (§ 1983 "permits recovery for only
4
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on personal security."'2 7 In addition, the court determined that David-
son's status as a prisoner would not deprive him of the right to assert
this fourteenth amendment protection. 28 Consequently, the court re-
jected defendants' assertion and concluded that Davidson did have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in personal security. 29
The majority proceeded to focus on the central issue before the
court: whether section 1983 liability extends to state prison officials' fail-
ure to investigate threats against a prisoner made by a fellow inmate.3
0
The majority recognized the diverse approaches followed by various
courts in resolving the issue.3 1 Beginning its own analysis, the Third
'deprivations of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [federal]
Constitution and [federal] laws' ")). For the text of § 1983, see supra note 1.
27. 752 F.2d at 821 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
28. Id. at 821. Judge Sloviter observed that because the inmate is involun-
tarily confined and forced to live with other prisoners, the state is responsible
for the prisoner's safety. Id. The majority also relied on a recent Supreme
Court decision which held that individuals do not lose all their constitutional
rights upon incarceration. Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198
(1984) (prisoners should "be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsis-
tent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of
incarceration")).
Judge Sloviter noted that the due process clause is an appropriate basis for
a § 1983 claim when a prisoner is injured by another prisoner. Id. (citing Curtis
v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 518 (3d Cir. 1973) (plaintiffs assertion that defendant
prison officials prevented him from defending himself from attack by fellow pris-
oner was sufficient to implicate fourteenth amendment "right to be secure in his
person"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)).
The Third Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court has never restricted
this right to freedom from attack to attacks by the officials themselves. Id. at
822. The court pointed out that an official's negligence could contribute to a
prisoner's injury as readily as if the official had committed an intentional tort.
Id. The court used the example of an official opening a prison door with a lynch
mob waiting outside. Id. The Third Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court's
holding in Youngberg v. Romeo that a fourteenth amendment liberty interest was
implicated in a § 1983 claim against institution officials for failing to protect a
mentally retarded resident from his own violence and that of other residents. Id.
(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1972)).
29. 752 F.2d at 822. For a discussion of the Davidson dissent's discussion of
this liberty interest, see infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
30. 752 F.2d at 822-23. The Third Circuit pointed out the Supreme
Court's characterization of the issue as "elusive." Id. at 823 (citing Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)). For Judge Gibbons' description of the
issue, see infra note 73.
31. 752 F.2d at 823 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 533 (1981)
("The diversity in approaches [among the various federal courts] is legion.")).
Compare Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (prison
guard's negligence in leaving cell door open, resulting in someone taking claim-
ant's trial transcript, not actionable under § 1983), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978) and Hoit v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 1974) (§ 1983 complaint by
prisoners seeking damages from extended lockup dismissed for failure to allege
either intent to harm inmates or injuries serious enough to require medical at-
tention) and Dewell v. Larson, 489 F.2d 877, 882 (10th Cir. 1974) (standard of
liability in § 1983 suit against city and its police chief for failing to provide ade-
quate medical care for diabetic prisoner was whether exceptional circumstances
962
5
Wright: Civil Rights - Under Section 1983 Prison Officials Are Not Liable
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
1985] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 963
Circuit examined the Supreme Court's treatment of the question in
Monroe v. Pape,32 one of the earliest cases interpreting section 1983.
33
Judge Sloviter observed that the Monroe Court had rejected any willful-
ness requirement for a section 1983 claim.
34
However, Judge Sloviter explained that the language and holdings
of subsequent Supreme Court decisions rejected the idea that every tort
committed by a state official under color of state law ipso facto consti-
tuted a cause of action under section 1983. 35 Although noting the
Supreme Court's recognition of the need for a conclusive answer to the
issue of whether negligence will suffice for a section 1983 claim, Judge
and conduct so incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience
could be shown) with Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1975)
("civil rights action lies for wrongful confiscation or loss by prison officials of
inmate's property") and Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir. 1972)
(denial of medical care to incarcerated individual stated claim under § 1983) and
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 & n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (police officials
could be held liable under § 1983 for negligent training and supervision of sub-
ordinates if that resulted in constitutional deprivation), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. 752 F.2d at 823 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. 167). Judge Sloviter acknowl-
edged that prior to Monroe, most civil rights actions against state officers in-
volved 18 U.S.C. § 242, a criminal provision analogous to § 1983. Id. Section
242 provides as follows:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or Dis-
trict to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabit-
ant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are pre-
scribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) (emphasis added).
34. 752 F.2d at 823 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187). Judge Sloviter ex-
plained that the Monroe Court distinguished § 1983, which has no willfulness
requirement, from § 242, which does have such a requirement. Id. For the text
of § 1983, see supra note 1. For the text of § 242, see supra note 33.
35. 752 F.2d at 823-24 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)
("Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely be-
cause the victim is a prisoner."); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1976)
(tort committed by state officials, without more, does not constitute § 1983
cause of action); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945) (not all viola-
tions of local law result in deprivation of federal rights)). In her earlier discus-
sion of Monroe, Judge Sloviter focused on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
which distinguished between violations of a federal constitutional right and a
state right in tort law. 752 F.2d at 823 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan,
J., concurring)). Judge Sloviter quoted Justice Harlan's statement that "depriva-
tion of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a viola-
tion of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional
right." Id. (emphasis supplied by Judge Sloviter).
6
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Sloviter observed that no Supreme Court decision through 1979 sup-
ports the notion that a state official's negligence resulting in injury to a
person deprives the person of a fourteenth amendment right.36
The Third Circuit went on to examine the district court's reliance
on Parratt v. Taylor,37 for its holding below that section 1983 may be
based on negligence.3 8 In Parralt, a prisoner brought a section 1983
claim against prison officials alleging that they negligently lost his
"hobby materials . . . in violation of his right under the fourteenth
amendment not to have his property taken without due process of
law." ' 39 Although the Supreme Court found that the availability of state
remedies in Parratt satisfied due process requirements, 40 the district
court in Davidson focused on Justice Rehnquist's consideration, in dicta,
of the scope of section 1983:
Nothing in the language of § 1983 or its legislative history lim-
its the statute solely to intentional deprivations of constitu-
tional rights. In Baker v. McCollan we suggested that simply
because a wrong was negligently as opposed to intentionally
committed did not foreclose the possibility that such action
could be brought Under § 1983. 4 1
Judge Sloviter considered this language in the context of other
Supreme Court cases 42 and concluded that the district court's finding
that negligence was sufficient for a constitutional deprivation under the
36. 752 F.2d at 825. The Third Circuit explained that the two cases.in
which the Court addressed the issue were ultimately decided on other grounds.
Id. at 824-25 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Procunier v. Nava-
rette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)). In Navarette, the question presented was "whether
negligent failure to mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing letters states a cause of
action under section 1983." 434 U.S. at 559 n.6. The Court never answered
this question, Judge Sloviter explained, because the defendants were found to
have qualified immunity as a matter of law. 752 F.2d at 824.
In Baker, the plaintiff alleged that an arresting officer was negligent in falsely
imprisoning the wrong man. See id. at 825 (citing McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d
509, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). Judge Sloviter explained that the Baker Court held
that no constitutional right was violated because the officer had a valid arrest
warrant. 752 F.2d at 824 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44
(1979)).
37. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
38. 752 F.2d at 825 (citing Davidson v. O'Lone, No. 81-253, slip op. at 20
(D.N.J. Dec. 15, 1982)). Judge Sloviter found that the district court read Parratt
to hold "that a state official's negligence is sufficient to constitute a 'deprivation'
for due process purposes." Id.
39. 451 U.S. at 530.
40. Id. at 537-44. In fact, the case was decided on procedural due process
grounds. Id. at 543.
41. 752 F.2d at 826 (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534-35). For a discussion
ofJudge Gibbons' interpretation of Parratt in his dissenting opinion in Davidson,
see infra note 87.
42. 752 F.2d at 823-26 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
964 [Vol. 30: p. 958
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Parratt dicta was erroneous. 4 3 First, Judge Sloviter considered it un-
likely that the Parratt Court would overrule its earlier pronouncements
on this important issue without more detailed analysis or explicit lan-
guage. 44  She observed that Justice Rehnquist's language merely re-
peated earlier statements, in Monroe and Baker v. McCollan,45 that the
presence of an intentional deprivation of constitutional rights is not a
prerequisite for a section 1983 claim.4 6 Judge Sloviter emphasized that
such a proposition does not imply that negligence would suffice for a
section 1983 claim. 4 7 In so concluding, the Third Circuit relied on its
own opinions, 48 those of other courts,4 9 and its interpretation of the
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196
(1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
43. 752 F.2d at 826. Judge Sloviter admitted, however, that a literal read-
ing of Justice Rehnquist's dicta in Parratt would suggest that negligence could
deprive a person of a constitutional right, and thus, state a claim under § 1983.
Id.
44. Id. The majority considered it significant that in Baker v. McCollan, de-
cided two years before Parratt, and in Paul v. Davis, the Court had rejected the
idea that torts, cognizable at state law, become constitutional violations for
§ 1983 purposes simply because they were committed by persons acting under
color of state law. Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). The Third Circuit noted that if the Court was rul-
ing in Parratt that negligence would suffice for a § 1983 claim, that would
amount to a 180-degree turnaround from Baker and Paul. Id.
45. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
46. 752 F.2d at 826. For a discussion of the holding in Monroe, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the holding in Baker, see
supra note 36.
47. 752 F.2d at 826. Judge Sloviter observed that there is a broad range of
actions between negligent and intentional conduct. Id. Judge Sloviter con-
cluded that since the Parratt Court passed over the question of whether negli-
gence by a state official constituted a due process deprivation of property,
nothing in the majority's opinion in that case could lead to the conclusion that
negligent conduct by state officials constitutes a constitutional deprivation en-
compassed by § 1983. Id.
48. Id. at 826-27. Judge Sloviter relied on Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d 406 (3d
Cir. 1967), for the proposition that a § 1983 claim cannot be based solely on a
tortious act committed by a state official. Id. (citing Kent, 385 F.2d at 407). In
addition, Judge Sloviter cited with approval four cases which affirmed the Kent
holding: Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1008 (1982); Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1973); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1973); Nettles v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 889, 889
(3d Cir. 1971). Judge Sloviter concluded by noting that in Rhodes v. Robinson,
612 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit held that no due process or
eighth amendment violation results when "a person suffers injury as an inciden-
tal and unintended consequence of official actions." 752 F.2d at 827 (quoting
Rhodes, 612 F.2d at 772).
Furthermore, in a footnote to her discussion of Rhodes, Judge Sloviter noted
that a recent Third Circuit opinion read Parrat too broadly because it held "as a
general matter, that § 1983 affords a remedy for negligent deprivation of feder-
ally protected rights by persons acting under the color of state law." Id. at 827 &
n.6 (quoting Holman v. Hilton, 712 F.2d 854, 856 (3d Cir. 1983)). In Holman,
the Third Circuit struck down a New Jersey statute that barred prisoners from
taking legal action against any public entity or public employee until released
8
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legislative purpose of section 1983.50
Judge Sloviter pointed out that the court's holding in no way les-
sens the importance of section 1983 as a cause of action to be used when
state employees violate a person's constitutional rights, and cited exam-
ples of such action that would fall under section 1983, including unnec-
essary or unreasonable use of force by police officers or prison
officials, 5 1 intentional or reckless indifference to a prisoner's safety by
prison officials, 5 2 and established state procedures that infringe on an
individual's liberty or property interests. 5 3 However, after noting that
from confinement. Holman, 712 F.2d at 863 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-3
(West 1982)). The claimant sought compensation for personal articles de-
stroyed in a prison fire, after an administrative claim was rejected. Id. at 856.
The Third Circuit ruled that the failure to afford the prisoner the opportunity
for a hearing violated his right to due process. Id. at 862-63. For a discussion of
the dissent's analysis of Holman, see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
49. 752 F.2d at 827 (citing Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582, 584 &
n.2 (5th Cir. 1982); Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam)). The Third Circuit, however, acknowledged apparently contrary views
in Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206, 1209 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) and McKay
v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1373 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. 752 F.2d at 826 & n.5 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
Judge Sloviter explained that § 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1870 and 1871, designed to enforce the post-Civil War constitutional amend-
ments. Id. Judge Sloviter quoted Justice John Harlan's dissent in Civil Rights
Cases, which stated that the purpose of those amendments was to insure "the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him". Id. (quot-
ing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 44 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
51. 752 F.2d at 827-28 (citing Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir.
1981); Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d 829, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1980); Howell v. Cat-
aldi, 464 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1972)).
52. Id. at 828 (citing Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1981),
a 'd on other grounds sub nom. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Holmes v. Gol-
din, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980)). Judge Sloviter noted that the ability to
recover for intentional conduct or reckless indifference to a prisoner's safety is
consistent with the Third Circuit's holding in Curtis v. Everette. Id. at 828 (citing
Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 518 (3d Cir. 1973) (prisoner who charged
guards with "intentional conduct" in preventing him from defending himself
from another inmate's attack stated claim under § 1983), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
995 (1974)).
53. 752 F.2d at 828 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982) (state procedure that permitted claim to be terminated through no fault
of claimant declared invalid); Holman v. Hilton, 712 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1983)
(New Jersey law barring prisoners from suing public entities or public employ-
ees in tort invalidated)).
The Third Circuit also noted other examples of conduct that would fall
within the ambit of§ 1983. Id. (citing Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1124
(5th Cir. 1983) (ifjail "was administered in a manner virtually indifferent to the
safety of prisoners," prisoners' constitutional rights could be held to have been
violated); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1981) (police chiefs
issuance of regulation delaying disciplinary hearings into policemen's conduct
until adjudication of underlying arrest charges which proximately caused police
officers to file unwarranted charges against claimant fell within scope of § 1983);
966
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the availability of a state remedy does not preclude a section 1983 claim
where a liberty interest is violated,5 4 the court concluded that the prison
officials' negligence in Davidson did not deprive the plaintiff of his right
to due process under the fourteenth amendment.
55
Finally, the court considered Davidson's claim of deprivation of
procedural due process.5 6 The Third Circuit noted that Davidson did
not challenge the constitutionality of the New Jersey law immunizing the
state and its employees, and concluded that a due process argument was
misplaced.5 7 Additionally, the court found that no substantive right
under the fourteenth amendment was infringed upon by the defendants'
negligence, a necessary element for a procedural due process claim.
5 8
Consequently, the Third Circuit rejected Davidson's claim, refusing to
restrict the state's attempt to avoid liability. 5 9
Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1980) (where law en-
forcement officials failed to "establish or execute appropriate procedures for
preventing such serious malfunctions in the administration of justice," § 1983
claim could be stated), cert. dismissed sub nom. Finley v. Murray, 456 U.S. 604
(1982)).
54. 752 F.2d at 828. The Third Circuit distinguished Parratt, which held
that a post-deprivation remedy available at the state level would preclude a
§ 1983 action, where a property interest was violated. Id. (citing Parratt, 451 U.S.
at 543-44). Judge Sloviter emphasized the liberty interest at issue in Davidson. Id.
For a discussion of this liberty interest, see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying
text.
55. 752 F.2d at 829. Judge Sloviter explained that the officials' conduct was
not so outrageous as to constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right. Id.
Judge Sloviter described the conduct as follows: One official simply failed to
check on a subordinate's handling of the problem, while the subordinate forgot
to investigate the note, which was not specific in its threat and which did not
seem to pose an immediate emergency. Id. The court characterized this con-
duct as "mere negligence" insufficient to involve a § 1983 deprivation of a con-
stitutional right. Id. The Third Circuit observed that a contrary holding would
mean that § 1983 claims based on the fourteenth amendment would be judged
under a standard of care more stringent than the standard applied to prisoners'
eighth amendment claims or claims of involuntarily confined mental patients.
Id. at 829 n.9. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
56. Id. at 830. Davidson contended that his right to procedural due process
was violated by enactment of the state statute prohibiting a suit against the state
or prison employees by a prisoner injured by another prisoner. See id. (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b)(4) (West 1982)). For the text of this statute, see
supra note 18.
57. 752 F.2d at 830. Judge Sloviter noted that Davidson's claim was only
for money damages. Id. For a discussion of the dissent's approach to this issue,
see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
58. 752 F.2d at 830 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)). The court added that Davidson did not
allege the deprivation of any statutory or other entitlement, the presence of
which might have triggered a due process analysis. Id. See also J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 528 (2d ed. 1983) (impairment of
interest in life, liberty, or property necessary for due process clause to apply).
59. Id. at 830-31. The court noted that there is no constitutional right to
pursue a negligence cause of action in state court given that a state's right to
10
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Judge Garth, in a concurring opinion,60 contended that even if
mere negligence could deprive Davidson of a liberty interest, the ab-
sence of a state law remedy did not mean that a remedy must be avail-
able under section 1983.61 Applying a procedural due process
analysis, 6 2 Judge Garth balanced the state's interest in protecting its offi-
cials from liability against the individual's interest in monetary damages
for injuries suffered through another's negligence. 63 Judge Garth em-
phasized the importance of the state's interest in structuring its own tort
law, as long as the individual can still challenge "state action that is
wholly arbitrary or irrational." '6 4 Because Judge Garth found that the
state's interest outweighed that of the individual in this case, he con-
cluded that Davidson had "all the process which is his due," and thus
immunity has been securely established. Id. at 830 (citing Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1980)).
60. Judge Weis joined Judge Garth's concurrence. Id. at 831.
61. Id. Judge Garth observed that the mere fact that Davidson had no state
law remedy did not mean that he must have a remedy somewhere. Id. (emphasis in
original). Judge Garth suggested that such a result would frustrate the state's
ability to structure its tort law, by allowing plaintiffs to avoid the immunity stat-
ute and recover against the state or its employees in a different forum. Id. at 832
& n.4 (Garth,J., concurring). For the text of the immunity statute, see supra note
18. Judge Garth cited the example of a person negligently struck by a police car,
while the police were chasing a criminal. 752 F.2d at 832 & n.4 (Garth, J., con-
curring). Judge Garth opined that the availability of a federal cause of action in
such a case would trivialize § 1983 actions and would be inconsistent with the
statute's purpose. Id.
62. Id. at 831-33 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth noted that a proce-
dural due process analysis presupposes the deprivation of some constitutional
or statutory entitlement. Id. at 831 & n.2 (Garth,J., concurring) (citing Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)).
Judge Garth explained that since the majority rejected Davidson's claim that he
was deprived of a substantive right under the fourteenth amendment by defend-
ants' negligence, the majority properly did not conduct this procedural due pro-
cess analysis. Id.
Judge Garth then suggested that his only reason for conducting such an
analysis was the position taken by the dissenting opinions, that Davidson should
have a federal cause of action. Id.
63. Id. at 831-82 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth observed that analo-
gous precedent for such a balancing exists in other cases where immunity was
upheld. Id. at 831 n.3 (Garth, J., concurring) (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 754 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-28 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55
(1967)).
64. Id. at 831-32 (Garth, J., concurring) (quoting Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) (California law that provided absolute immunity for
those making parole decisions was not unconstitutional although it defeated
state tort claim)). Judge Garth added that Parratt does not restrict the state's
right to fashion its own laws if those laws do not conflict with federal law. Id. at
832 (Garth,J., concurring) (citing Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 198 (1979)).
Judge Garth also repeated the Supreme Court's statement in Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982), that "the state remains free to create
substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication." 752 F.2d at 832
(Garth, J., concurring).
[Vol. 30: p. 958
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reached the same result as the majority in deciding that Davidson should
be denied recovery.
6 5
In his dissent, then Chief Judge Seitz stated that Davidson satisfied
the four essential elements of a section 1983 claim: 66 (1) the defendant
must have acted under color of state law; 6 7 (2) an interest in life, liberty,
or property must be at stake;6 8 (3) the conduct complained of must
amount to a deprivation; 6 9 and (4) the state must have failed to provide
due process of law. 70 ChiefJudge Seitz explained that his principal disa-
greement with the majority revolved around its finding that there was no
deprivation in this case. 7 ' ChiefJudge Seitz then pointed out that since
65. 752 F.2d at 832-33 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth insisted
that those who advocate a federal constitutional remedy by default
(where no state remedy is available) have failed to consider and to bal-
ance the state's interest against the interest asserted by the claimant. In
failing to do so, they have also failed to recognize that a state may af-
ford appropriate due process without that process necessarily resulting
in a recovery for the claimant.
Id. at 832 (Garth, J., concurring) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792 (4th
Cir. 1983)).
66. 752 F.2d at 833 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535-
37). Chief Judge Seitz commented that the Parratt Court itself identified these
four elements after looking at the language of the fourteenth amendment and
§ 1983. Id.
67. Id. ChiefJudge Seitz observed that the defendants, being state prison
officials, clearly acted under color of state law. Id. (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at
172-85).
68. Id. On this point, Chief Judge Seitz noted his agreement with the ma-
jority that plaintiffs interest in personal security falls within the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of liberty. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1984)). For a discussion of the majority's treatment of this point, see supra
notes 26-29 and accompanying text. ChiefJudge Seitz further agreed with the
majority that a prisoner retains this liberty interest except to the extent that it is
"fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the
objectives of incarceration." 752 F.2d at 833 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198 (1984)). ChiefJudge Seitz concluded
that Davidson's interest in freedom from attack was not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner. Id.
69. 752 F.2d at 833 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz concluded
that the conduct in Davidson amounted to a deprivation. Id. (citing Parratt, 451
U.S. at 536-37 (negligent loss of property constituted deprivation); Holman v.
Hilton, 712 F.2d 854, 856 (3d Cir. 1983) ("section 1983 affords a remedy for
negligent deprivations")).
70. Id. at 834 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz observed that no
post-deprivation remedy was available to Davidson, and that therefore no dis-
cussion as to adequacy of procedures was necessary. Id. The lack of any proce-
dural due process, combined with the satisfaction of the other three elements,
made plaintiffs claim cognizable under § 1983, according to ChiefJudge Seitz.
Id.
71. Id. at 835 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz pointed out the
"essential" language in Parratt, which the majority had ignored, which explained
that a loss "even though negligently caused, amotunted to a deprivation." Id.
(citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-37 (footnote omitted)). Chief Judge Seitz also
found it persuasive that in a concurrence in Parratt, Justice Powell indicated that
he would not have found that "a negligent act . . .works a deprivation in the
12
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the Parratt Court acknowledged that negligence by a state official
amounted to a deprivation, and since the other elements were present, a
section 1983 claim would be cognizable. 7 2
Judge Gibbons wrote a lengthy dissent to the majority's opinion. 73
After discussing and criticizing the development of New Jersey's immu-
nity statute,74 Judge Gibbons began an analysis of the federal liberty
interest involved in Davidson.75 Judge Gibbons joined the majority in
constitutional sense." Id. (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548 (Powell, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original)). To ChiefJudge Seitz this suggested that the Parratt ma-
jority had concluded that negligence can cause a constitutional deprivation. Id.
72. Id. Chief Judge Seitz also rejected the argument that a § 1983 claim
could not be sustained unless the "deliberate indifference" standard of the
eighth amendment had been met. Id. at 854 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). He pointed
out that constitutional violations under the eighth and fourteenth amendments
are to be measured by entirely different standards; therefore, failure to state a
claim under the eighth amendment would not preclude reliance on the four-
teenth. Id.
73. 752 F.2d at 835-54 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons, at the
outset, characterized the "narrow" issue presented upon appeal:
[M]ay a state, when it involuntarily commits persons to the custody of
state agents, thereby depriving those persons of the capacity for flight,
self defense, or calls for assistance, consistent with the fourteenth
amendment relieve those agents of the duty to take reasonable care to
prevent third parties from injuring them.
Id. at 835 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons emphasized that because the
duty of care owed to persons at liberty was not involved, the issue was not any
broader. Id. Nor was it a narrower one, he asserted, because regardless of the
reason for commitment, all those involuntarily committed are in the same posi-
tion with respect to defending themselves against aggressive acts by others. Id.
74. Id. at 836-38 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § § 59:2-4,
:5-3, :5-4, :6-2, :6-7 (West 1982)). Judge Gibbons was disturbed by the broad
immunity conferred on New Jersey employees. Id. He noted with disapproval
the legislature's contraction of the state's duty to act for the public good. Id. at
837 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Gibbons lamented the total immu-
nity afforded state custodians in caring for inmates. Id.
75. Id. at 838-40 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons began by noting
that in 1976 the Supreme Court was "flirting with the dangerous notion" that to
be protected by the fourteenth amendment a life or liberty interest had to have
some foundation in state positive law. Id. at 838-39 (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (liberty interest in one's personal
reputation must be based on state law); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228
(1976) (due process clause was not violated where state prisoner was transferred
to less desirable prison without hearing, absent some state requirement for such
hearing); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976) (state prisoner's right
to resist transfer to worse conditions is dependent on applicable state law)).
Judge Gibbons observed that such a trend confused property rights, which are
always based on positive law, with life and liberty rights, which are not. 752 F.2d
at 839 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons went on to note the Court's
subsequent abandonment of the requirement of a state law basis for a life or
liberty interest and its reaffirmance of the proposition that a fourteenth amend-
ment liberty interest exists independently of state law. Id. at 839-40 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting)(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)(the involunta-
rily committed do not lose their federally protected interest in personal safety);
Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980) ("convicted prisoner had a federally
protected liberty interest ... in freedom from confinement in a mental institu-
13
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rejecting New Jersey's contention that Davidson had no constitutionally
protected right to safety while confined. 76
Judge Gibbons next addressed the issue of a state of mind require-
ment in section 1983. 77 He observed that in Monroe, the Supreme Court
was unanimous in rejecting any such requirement. 78 Judge Gibbons ac-
knowledged that in later cases the Court considered injecting a state of
mind requirement into section 1983; 79 but he found it significant that in
Martinez v. California,8" the Court utilized a traditional tort law analysis in
rejecting a section 1983 claim against parole officials responsible for re-
leasing a sex offender who subsequently murdered the claimants'
daughter. 8 1 Judge Gibbons interpreted the Martinez opinion as sug-
gesting that if proximate cause standards had been met, section 1983
would have provided a remedy, regardless of the state of mind.82
tion"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979) (fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees right to freedom from confinement unless state shows person
is incapable of caring for himself under more substantial standard than mere
preponderance of evidence); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)
("right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on
personal security" is protected by due process clause)).
76. 752 F.2d at 840 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). For a discussion of the major-
ity's position on this issue, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. 752 F.2d at 840-49 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons examined
the language and circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 1983, and con-
cluded that all remedies available at common law were encompassed by the stat-
ute. Id. at 849 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Judge
Gibbons opined that many of those remedies had no state of mind requirement,
and that if Congress had desired such a requirement, it would have written it
into § 1983. Id.
78. Id. at 842 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187).
Judge Gibbons pointed out that the Monroe Court was unanimous in its view that
specific intent should not be required in a § 1983 action. Id. Judge Gibbons
also discussed with approval a Third Circuit case consistent with Monroe. Id. at
842-43 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.
1965)). Judge Gibbons pointed out that, in Basista, the defendants argued that
because a policeman defendant acted out of malice toward the plaintiff, his acts
should not be encompassed by a § 1983 claim because such conduct is not
"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Id. at 842
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Basista, 340 F.2d at 80). Judge Gibbons then
discussed the Third Circuit's rejection of that argument in its holding that
"neither specific intent nor purpose to deprive an individual of his civil rights" is
required for a § 1983 claim. Id. at 843 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Basista,
340 F.2d at 81).
79. Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1979); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559 n.6 (1978)). Judge Gibbons observed, however,
that neither of those cases overruled Monroe. Id.
80. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
81. 752 F.2d at 844-45 (Gibbons,J., dissenting) (citing Martinez, 444 U.S. at
279-80, 285). In Martinez, the case was dismissed because the victim's death was
too remote in time from the officials' action. 444 U.S. at 285.
82. 752 F.2d at 845 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons found Marti-
nez significant for two reasons: (1) the case indicates that § 1983 actions, even if
pursued in state court, need not be restricted by state immunity laws; and (2) the
Supreme Court relied on tort law principles, thus negligence could have lead to
1985]
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 958
Judge Gibbons then examined what he termed the majority's "un-
principled treatment of precedent."'8 3 Judge Gibbons was particularly
disturbed by the majority's attempt to distinguish Holman v. Hilton8 4
from the case at bar because in Holman, the plaintiff expressly contested
the validity of the state immunity statute, whereas Davidson did not.8 5
He further criticized the majority's reliance on a number of Supreme
Court rulings for the proposition that the state can relieve its custodians
of the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect their charges from
harm.8 6 Judge Gibbons concluded by suggesting that the majority had
liability if causation had been established. Id. (citing Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284-
85).
83. Id. at 849 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons noted that the ma-jority ignored its own precedent in Holman v. Hilton, as well as Supreme Court
precedent. Id. (citing Holman v. Hilton, 712 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1983)).
84. 712 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1983).
85. 752 F.2d at 850 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Holman, 712 F.2d at
856). For a discussion of Holman, see supra note 48.
Judge Gibbons noted that Davidson appeared pro se and that therefore his
complaint should be judged less strictly than complaints written by attorneys.
752 F.2d at 850 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons then addressed the
majority's second distinction of Holman from Davidson-that no substantive right
in the case at bar was violated by defendants' negligence; whereas, in Holman,
the Third Circuit held that a statute barring suits by prisoners against the gov-
ernment or its employees unconstitutionally deprived the prisoner of a four-
teenth amendment property interest. Id. at 851 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing
Holman, 712 F.2d at 859). Judge Gibbons suggested that the majority had mis-
applied Holman, either by "lochnerizing" the Holman holding, that is, by afford-
ing an interest in liberty less protection than a property interest, or by ignoring
it. Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Holman, 712 F.2d at
863).
86. 752 F.2d at 851-53 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Youngberg v. Ro-
meo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
In Estelle, the prisoner's § 1983 claim of "cruel and unusual punishment"
for inadequate medical treatment was dismissed because there was insufficient
evidence to show deliberate indifference on the part of prison authorities, the
established standard for an eighth amendment violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Judge Gibbons construed Judge Sloviter's opinion as interpreting Estelle to state
that state agents may be relieved of their duty to provide reasonable care to
inmates under their control. 752 F.2d at 852 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For the
majority's discussion of Estelle, see supra note 35 and accompanying text. The
dissent contended that such a reading misinterpreted Estelle, in which only an
eighth amendment claim was made and found insufficient. 752 F.2d at 852 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons noted that the state agents in Estelle were
not relieved of any duty to care for prisoners; in fact, the prisoner could still sue
in state court on the negligence claim. Id.
Judge Gibbons likewise discounted the majority's reliance on Paul v. Davis
for the proposition that state agents may not have to use reasonable care to
protect their prisoners from harm. Id. (citing Paul, 424 U.S. 693). For the ma-
jority's discussion of Paul, see supra notes 35 & 44 and accompanying text.
Judge Gibbons contended that Paul was inapposite because it held only that
damage to reputation was insufficient to implicate any interest which would war-
rant protection under the due process clause. 752 F.2d at 852 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
972
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formulated a new standard by requiring more than "mere negligence"
for a section 1983 claim, and that the case should be remanded to the
district court.
87
Confronting a difficult question that has been interpreted in a vari-
ety of ways, 88 Judge Sloviter succinctly stated the primary issue in David-
son as whether a prisoner's claim for personal injuries sustained as a
result of prison officials' negligence is actionable under section 1983,
when no remedy is available under state law. 89 In resolving this issue,
however, it is submitted that the Davidson majority relied too strongly on
certain Supreme Court cases and other cases of limited precedential rel-
evance, while failing to adequately address clear language present in
both the Court's opinion in Parratt and in the Third Circuit's own deci-
sion in Basista v. Weir,9 0 language which contradicts the proposition that
negligence is not actionable under section 1983.91
The majority began its examination of the issue in Davidson by dis-
cussing Monroe v. Pape,9 2 which involved a section 1983 claim against
police officers who broke into the petitioners' home without a warrant. 9 3
Judge Gibbons also criticized the majority's comparison of Davidson with
Youngberg v. Romeo. 752 F.2d at 852 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307). He contended that Judge Sloviter read Youngberg to
stand for the proposition that a state can relieve its custodians of the duty to
exercise reasonable care for the involuntarily committed. Id. Judge Gibbons
pointed out, however, that the Youngberg Court merely determined the standard
of care in such a situation to be that of "accepted professional judgment." Id.
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323).
87. 752 F.2d at 854 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons suggested
that the majority's holding would create a gross negligence-mere negligence
distinction which would be difficult to make as a matter of law. Id. Judge Gib-
bons noted the trial judge's reliance on Parratt for the contention that ordinary
negligence sufficed for a § 1983 claim, and concluded that the case should be
remanded so the judge could examine the evidence "in light of the new stan-
dard" the majority announced. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981)).
88. See 752 F.2d at 823 & n.4.
89. Id. at 817. For a discussion of Judge Gibbons' characterization of the
issue in Davidson, see supra note 73.
Observing that the factual finding of negligence was not so "clearly errone-
ous" as to merit reversal and that Davidson did have a fourteenth amendment
liberty interest in personal safety, an undivided court appropriately dismissed
the officials' first two arguments, and focused its attention on the issue thus nar-
rowed. 752 F.2d at 820-22. For a discussion of the majority's treatment of the
factual finding of negligence, see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Davidson's liberty interest, see supra notes 26-29 and accompany-
ing text.
90. 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
91. For a discussion of the majority's reliance on various Supreme Court
cases, see supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the ma-
jority's reading of Parratt, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
92. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
93. Id. at 169-70. The petitioners in Monroe sued Chicago police officers
who broke into their home, ransacked it, and detained the petitioners' father for
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Although noting that the majority in Monroe had acknowledged that
willfullness was not required for a section 1983 claim, 94 Judge Sloviter
focused on Justice Harlan's concurrence, specifically his distinction of
the deprivation of a constitutional right from the violation of a state
right.9 5 The Third Circuit continued its analysis by relying on Estelle v.
Gamble9 6 and Paul v. Davis9 7 to reject the notion that a state law tort
committed by an official acting under color of state law necessarily con-
stitutes a cause of action under section 1983.98 Though it is entirely rea-
sonable, and in fact is mandated by the language of the statute, 99 that
not every tortious action by a state officer is cognizable under section
1983, it is contended that a tort nevertheless may deprive a person of a
constitutional right, and in such a case, section 1983 should be available.
To the extent that the Third Circuit relied on Estelle and Paul to
illustrate, for purposes of its analysis in Davidson, the situation in which a
ten hours without preferring charges. Id. The officers acted without a warrant.
Id.
94. 752 F.2d at 823 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187). The Monroe Court
distinguished § 1983 from 18 U.S.C. § 242, its criminal counterpart, which the
Court had previously found to have a willfulness requirement. 365 U.S. at 187
(citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945)). See 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1982). The Monroe Court noted that the word "willfully" was not contained in
the language of § 1983, nor was vagueness an issue, as it had been in Screws. 365
U.S. at 187. The Court concluded that § 1983 "should be read against the back-
ground of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions." Id.
95. 752 F.2d at 823 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan,J., concurring)).
Justice Harlan asserted in Monroe that Congress in enacting § 1983 must have
intended that "a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different
from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a
different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and
the deprivation of a constitutional right." 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
It is suggested, however, that Justice Harlan's objective was to respond to
the Monroe dissent's distinction of state-authorized unconstitutional action,
which should be actionable under § 1983, from unconstitutional conduct not
authorized by the state, which the state courts can remedy. See id. at 194-98
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that such a distinction would
serve only a jurisdictional function, increasing the caseload of lower federal
courts, while lessening the burden of review of state courts on the Supreme
Court. Id. at 195 (Harlan,J., concurring). Justice Harlan dismissed such reason-
ing, concluding that "[t]he statute becomes more than a jurisdictional provision
only if one attributes to the enacting legislature the view that a deprivation of a
constitutional right is . . . more serious than a violation of a state right." Id. at
196 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, it is contended that Justice Harlan's words,
taken in their proper context, are inconclusive with respect to the state tort-
constitutional violation distinction advanced by Judge Sloviter in Davidson.
96. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
97. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
98. 752 F.2d at 823-24 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Estelle, 429 U.S. 97
(1976)).
99. For the text of § 1983, see supra note 1 (limiting § 1983 actions to dep-
rivations of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution").
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state tort does not amount to a constitutional deprivation, it is submitted
that these cases are inapposite. In Estelle, a prisoner unsuccessfully
brought suit under section 1983 against prison medical personnel for
violating the eighth amendment by their allegedly inadequate treatment
of the prisoner's back injury. °0 0 In Paul, the Court rejected a section
1983 claim that various police chiefs' distribution of flyers listing the
plaintiff as an "active shoplifter" deprived the plaintiff of "some 'liberty'
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'' In both cases the
Supreme Court concluded that the allegedly tortious conduct failed to
infringe upon a constitutionally protected interest.' 0 2 In Davidson, on
the other hand, the judges of the Third Circuit were in total agreement
that the prison officials' conduct implicated Davidson's constitutionally
protected liberty interest in personal safety.103
Focusing on the primary issue in Davidson, whether a section 1983
claim can be grounded in simple negligence, the Third Circuit relied on
Baker v. McCollan10 4 to argue that the resolution of this issue may de-
pend on which constitutional right has allegedly been violated.' 0 5 Baker
involved a case of mistaken identity where an arrest warrant was issued
in the claimant's name, though the true subject of the warrant was the
claimant's brother. 10 6 The Court held that fourth amendment require-
ments were satisfied because the arrest warrant was based on probable
cause and therefore validly issued; further, the Court held that the
claimant's detention for three days did not rise to the level of a four-
teenth amendment deprivation of liberty without due process.' 0 7 While
Judge Sloviter concluded that Baker and Davidson should be analyzed in
the same manner because both cases involved state officials obligated
100. 429 U.S. at 98-101. The Court dismissed the claim because the al-
leged malpractice did not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment," and held
that the appropriate forum for a claim of malpractice was state court under a
state tort claims act. Id. at 107.
101. 424 U.S. at 697, 699-700.
102. In Estelle, the standard for a violation of the eighth amendment, "de-
liberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners," was not met. 429
U.S. at 104-07. In Paul, the Court concluded that damage to personal reputa-
tion did not implicate a fourteenth amendment interest. 424 U.S. at 701-02.
103. 752 F.2d at 821-22; id. at 852 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
104. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
105. 752 F.2d at 824-25 (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 139-40)). In Baker, Justice
Rehnquist opined that while negligence might suffice for some constitutional
violations under § 1983, other constitutional rights might require more than
that. 443 U.S. at 139-40.
106. 443 U.S. at 144. In Baker, the claimant's brother was arrested,
charged, and released in the claimant's name because the brother was carrying
the claimant's driver's license. Id. at 141. Later, an arrest warrant was issued
and the claimant was taken into custody. Id. After spending three days in jail,
the claimant was released. Id.
107. Id. at 143-46. The Court noted that the claimant's innocence of the
charge which was the subject of the warrant would be material to a tort claim of
false imprisonment, but was irrelevant to a constitutional claim. Id. at 145.
19851 975
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under state tort law to care for prisoners,10 8 it is contended that the
similarity between the cases really ends there. In Baker, the Court con-
cluded that due process had been afforded the claimant because there
was probable cause for the arrest.' 0 9 In Davidson, on the other hand, it
is submitted that the claimant has not received all the process he is due.
Rather, he has suffered an injury to a constitutionally protected right as
a result of defendants' negligence, and has no remedy available to him.
Realizing that Parratt v. Taylor formed much of the basis for the
lower court's decision in Davidson, the Third Circuit concentrated on re-
jecting the lower court's holding under Parratt that a section 1983 claim
could include actions alleging negligence."10 In Parratt, the Supreme
Court held that prison officials' negligent loss of an inmate's property
was not actionable under section 1983 where a post-deprivation remedy
was available. I'I The Third Circuit conceded that certain language in
Parratt indicated that negligence alone might work a constitutional dep-
rivation.' 12 The Third Circuit dismissed such an interpretation, how-
ever, in light of Supreme Court precedent rejecting the notion that torts
become constitutional violations when committed by state officials.' 13
But in the two cases cited by the Third Circuit to support its reasoning,
Baker and Paul, no constitutionally protected interest was deprived.' 14
Had no remedy been available in Parratt, it is suggested that the negli-
gence would have been actionable under section 1983. This does not
contradict Baker and Paul, as the Third Circuit suggests, but merely dis-
tinguishes the situation where a constitutional right is violated from the
situation where a state tort violates no constitutional right.
108. See 752 F.2d at 825.
109. 443 U.S. at 141. For a discussion of the Baker Court's rejection of the
alleged constitutional deprivation in that case, see supra text accompanying note
107.
110. 752 F.2d at 825-26. Judge Sloviter concluded that the lower court's
interpretation of Parratt was too broad. Id.
11. Id. (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537-44). The inmate was in isolation
when his package arrived. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530. As a result he was not al-
lowed to receive the property and when he was released from isolation, the pack-
age could not be located. Id. The prisoner sued the prison officials under
§ 1983. Id.
With respect to the post-deprivation remedy available to the inmate, the
Parratt Court concluded that the inmate could be compensated, and therefore no
due process violation had been shown. Id. at 543 (citation omitted). The Court
noted that a pre-deprivation hearing was impractical in this situation, and that a
"meaningful opportunity subsequent to the initial taking for a determination of
rights and liabilities" would suffice. Id. at 541.
112. 752 F.2d at 826. For this language, see supra text accompanying note
41. As Judge Sloviter put it: "Admittedly, this language standing alone is sus-
ceptible of the interpretation placed upon it by the district court that mere negli-
gence can constitute a deprivation that can be redressed by a § 1983 action." Id.
113. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Baker, see supra
notes 36 & 104-09 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Court's rea-
soning in Paul, see supra notes 35, 44 & 10 1-02 and accompanying text.
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In holding that mere negligence was insufficient for a section 1983
claim, the Third Circuit also relied on its own previous decisions as well
as those from other circuits.1 15 However, the Third Circuit failed to dis-
cuss at least one case in which it held that state of mind was irrelevant in
a section 1983 claim. In Basista v. Weir,' 1 6 where the victim of an alleged
police beating and illegal detention brought suit, the Third Circuit held
that a section 1983 claim would be cognizable so long as a person's fed-
eral rights were violated by a state official.' '17 It is suggested that this
case should have at least been addressed in Davidson. If the Third Cir-
cuit intended to overrule Basista, it should have done so explicitly.
The Third Circuit also pointed to the legislative purpose in enact-
ing section 1983 to support the argument that negligence claims should
not be encompassed within the private cause of action created by the
statute." 8 The court noted that historically the Civil Rights Act of 1971
was designed to protect newly freed blacks after the Civil War.' 19 Fur-
ther, the court opined that section 1983 was aimed at remedying "mis-
use" of official power,120 implying that commission of a negligent tort is
not "misuse" of power. It is suggested, however, that the Third Circuit
115. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reliance on these cases, see
supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
116. 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
117. Id. at 81. In Basista, the § 1983 claimant alleged that police assaulted
and illegally detained him at the police station. Id. at 77. The Third Circuit
rejected any intent requirement, noting that "[w]e are compelled to the conclu-
sion that Congress gave a right of action sounding in tort to every individual
whose federal rights were trespassed upon by any officer acting under pretense
of federal law." Id. at 81 (quoting Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240,
249 (3d Cir. 1945)). The court noted that "the Civil Rights Act is not to be
interpreted narrowly." Id.
Other circuits have failed to reconcile conflicting opinions as well. See, e.g.,
McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (claimant who was negli-
gently rearrested twice after release on bond, was successful in § 1983 action
despite defendant's argument that negligence alone would not support such an
action); Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) (negli-
gence would suffice for § 1983 claim); Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582,
584 (5th Cir. 1982) (to constitute § 1983 cause of action conduct must be suffi-
ciently egregious as to be constitutionally tortious); Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337,
340 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (§ 1983 claim dismissed where shooting
of escaped prisoner by police was negligent).
118. For a discussion of the majority's reliance on the historical role of
§ 1983, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
119. 752 F.2d at 826 n.5. The majority relied in part on Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35 (1883) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (purpose of Civil War amendments was to secure freedom and protec-
tion of newly released slaves). Judge Sloviter also pointed to language in Monroe
v. Pape indicating that concern about the Ku Klux Klan also motivated Congress'
passage of post-Civil War civil rights legislation. 752 F.2d at 826 n.5 (citing
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174).
120. 752 F.2d at 827 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172). Judge Sloviter also
relied on language in Paul v. Davis supporting the same proposition. Id. (citing
Paul, 424 U.S. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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may have overemphasized the authoritative weight of the statute's legis-
lative history in light of the recent widespread use of section 1983 by
various classes of litigants. 12 '
The Third Circuit's manipulation of precedent, as well as its narrow
construction of a generally worded statute, does not adequately justify
its conclusion that Davidson's claim for damages should be rejected. It
is suggested that Judge Gibbons' approach is more straightforward: he
found a breach of the standard of care owed to a state prison inmate and
concluded that such a breach resulted in the loss of a constitutionally
protected personal liberty interest, and thus amounted to a constitu-
tional deprivation actionable under section 1983.122
The Third Circuit's holding in Davidson v. O'Lone that some culpable
state of mind, and not mere negligence, is required for a section 1983
claim makes it more difficult for claimants alleging injury to constitu-
tionally protected interests to have their day in court. Although this may
have a desirable effect of clearing the federal docket, it may leave per-
sons wronged by state officials without a remedy, particularly in juris-
dictions providing such officials with statutory immunity from certain
state law tort actions. It seems only fair that victims of negligent con-
duct be able to recover from the tortfeasor. It is suggested that preclud-
ing section 1983 suits against negligent prison employees protects
negligent conduct in the operation of state correctional institutions;
121. See Aldisert, supra note 3, at 566-67. Chief Judge Aldisert has ex-
pressed concern over the burden placed on federal courts by the recent expan-
sion of § 1983 claims, both in number and type. Id.
It is further submitted that the majority's dismissal of Davidson's procedural
due process claim on improper pleading grounds is, as Judge Gibbons sug-
gested, an "outrageous violation of the standards ... for measuring the suffi-
ciency of a pro se litigant's pleading." 752 F.2d at 850 (Gibbons,J., dissenting).
Judge Gibbons observed that Davidson argued his own case throughout the trial
and received the benefit of counsel only at the appellate level. Id. The plead-
ings standards were explained in Haines v. Kerner, wherein the Supreme Court
held that courts should judge pro se pleadings less strictly than those written by
attorneys. 404 U.S. 519, 519-20 (1972) (prisoner who suffered injuries while in
disciplinary confinement was denied due process and should be afforded oppor-
tunity to present evidence in court, regardless of adequacy of complaint). Under
the Haines standard, it would seem that Davidson's complaint was scrutinized too
carefully, and that the Third Circuit could have assumed that Davidson intended
to challenge the constitutionality of the NewJersey statute precluding him from
suing the prison officials in a standard tort action. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-
2b(4) (West 1982). Judge Gibbons stated that it was clear that the trial court
assumed that Davidson's claim was brought under § 1983 because state law pre-
cluded him from recovering against the prison officials. 752 F.2d at 850 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting). To support his statement, Judge Gibbons noted language
the trial court used in analyzing the issues presented before it. Id. at 850 n.28.
122. 752 F.2d at 848-50 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). For a discussion ofJudge
Gibbons' analysis in Davidson, see supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
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whereas an opposite result in Davidson would have helped to deter such
conduct.
Donna M. W'Vright
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